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Background: Identification of predictors of outlet strut fracture is
important for recipients of large ( ‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley con-
vexo-concave mitral valves when it comes to decision making on pro-
phylactic explantation. An association between the manufacturing
process of Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves and the risk of fracture
has been suggested. Objective: The aim of this study was to determine
which items from the manufacturing records, in addition to known risk
factors, were predictive of fracture of large 60-degree Björk-Shiley con-
vexo-concave mitral valves. Methods: All Dutch recipients (n = 2264) of
Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves were followed up until fracture,
death, reoperation, or end of the study (July 1, 1996). Information was
abstracted from the manufacturing records of large 60-degree Björk-
Shiley convexo- concave mitral valves (n = 655) in Dutch recipients and
included items that described the manufacturing process and items for
which an association with strut fracture had been suggested. Manu-
facturing records were available for 637 valves (97%), including 25
fractured valves. Results: Multivariate analysis identified age at implan-
tation (hazard ratio 0.95, 95% confidence interval 0.93-0.97), lot size
(<175 valves versus ‡ 175 valves; hazard ratio 6.6, 95% confidence
interval 2.2-20.1), number of hook deflection tests performed (0 or 1
versus ‡ 2; hazard ratio 4.7, 95% confidence interval 1.4-16.2), number
of disks that were used (1 versus ‡ 2; hazard ratio 5.9, 95% confidence
interval 1.9-18.5), and lot fracture percentage (hazard ratio 1.6, 95%
confidence interval 1.4-1.8) as independent predictors of fracture.
Although the added predictive value of a model with these 5 variables
was sizable compared with a model containing age only, it was only
slightly better than a model with age, lot size, and lot fracture percent-
age. Conclusion: If the serial number of a large 60-degree Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave mitral valve is known, manufacturing information
can add significantly to the prediction of fracture. Information on lot
size and lot fracture percentage should be made available to clinicians
for risk assessment of prophylactic explantation. (J Thorac Cardiovasc
Surg 1999;117:766-75)
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T he problem of strut fracture with the Björk-Shileyconvexo-concave valve (Shiley, Inc, Irvine, Calif)
has entered its third decade after the first report of a
fracture during a clinical trial in 1978. At present most
of the strut fractures reported have been of large (‡ 29
mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral
valves. Risk estimation therefore seems especially
important for the 8900 recipients of large 60-degree
Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves who are
still alive worldwide.
There is a need to improve prediction of outlet strut
fracture for recipients of large Björk-Shiley convexo-
concave mitral valves. Improved prediction of outlet
strut fracture would not only determine for which
patients prophylactic replacement of the Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave valve should be considered but also
would prevent unnecessary operations on patients at
low risk for strut fracture. We extended the follow-up of
the Dutch Björk-Shiley convexo-concave cohort
because prolonged follow-up would yield more precise
information about the hazard of strut fracture and allow
us to determine more precisely which subgroups are at
very high risk of strut fracture. Moreover, because it
has been suggested that production batch–related dif-
ferences may contribute to the risk of strut fracture,1-3
we included information on manufacturing records that
were made available for our cohort. Here we present
the results of a study on the manufacturing records of
Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves and the risk of
outlet strut fracture in patients with a large (‡ 29 mm)
60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valve.
The aim of the study was to determine which items
from the manufacturing records predict the occurrence
of outlet strut fracture.
Methods
Patients. The Dutch Björk-Shiley convexo-concave cohort
includes 2264 Dutch Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valve
recipients who were identified during our first Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave follow-up study.4 After the data were
updated in 1995,5 we extended the follow-up until July 1,
1996. Mean duration of follow-up was 10.0 years (range 0-17
years); follow-up was complete in all but 46 cases (98.0%).
Fifty strut fractures were documented. Two other fractures of
large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave
valves (1 aortic valve and 1 mitral valve) were reported after
the closing date of follow-up. For this study we selected all
patients with a large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley con-
vexo-concave mitral valve (n = 665), among whom 25 frac-
tures were reported until July 1, 1996.
Manufacturing information. A schematic representation
of the manufacturing process of Björk-Shiley convexo-con-
cave valves, with its documentation, is shown in Table I. We
familiarized ourselves with the manufacturing process of
Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves by reviewing the man-
ufacturing process, as documented by Shiley and as described
by other researchers6-8 and by a subcommittee of The
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of
Representatives.9 We also visited and interviewed (former)
employees of Shiley, metallurgists, and other people who
were acquainted with the manufacturing process at Shiley.
Manufacturing records were obtained from Shiley, after
negotiations by an independent Dutch foundation and the rul-
ing in the Bowling v Pfizer class settlement.10,11 The manu-
facturing records were matched on the basis of valve serial
numbers with Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves known
to be implanted in Dutch valve recipients.4,5 Shiley also pro-
vided us with their research database (updated until August
1995), a passive after-market surveillance system. This con-
tains, among other things, a list of valve serial numbers
assumed to have been implanted, dates of reported fractures,
and valve identifiers as listed on the manufacturing records.
Table II shows a summary of the items chosen for abstrac-
tion; the complete set of variables abstracted is available on
request. The items abstracted were chosen to ensure a com-
prehensive description of the complete production process.
Certain items were chosen because a relationship with strut
fracture was suggested in previous publications8,9 or by per-
sons familiar with the production process.
The data were abstracted from the manufacturing records
by a team of students hired for this study. The students were
trained and supervised during abstraction by 2 of the authors
(M. K. and Y. v. d. G.). All data were abstracted twice by dif-
ferent students, who were blinded with respect to each others’
work, and double entered in the study database. All inconsis-
tencies were checked and resolved; if necessary, data were
abstracted again and errors in the database were corrected.
For each lot from which valves were implanted in The
Netherlands, the percentage of valves fractured from a lot (lot
fracture percentage), as reported in the Shiley research data-
base, was added to our database.
Data analysis. We studied the relationships of items ab-
stracted from the manufacturing records to the occurrence of
outlet strut fracture. Cumulative survival curves according to
the Kaplan-Meier product limit method were used for graphi-
cal comparison.12 The log-rank test was used for comparison
between subgroups. For the identification of independent risk
factors of outlet strut fracture, a Cox proportional hazards
regression model was used.13 We first studied continuous vari-
ables as linear variables in the regression models. The lineari-
ty assumption was tested by inclusion of transformations of
these variables (square, square root, logarithm, inverse). If non-
linearity was detected (P < .10), a transformed variable was
entered in the model. For the lot fracture percentage, a simple
linear term was appropriate. The lot size was nonlinearly relat-
ed to fracture, and the use of a cutoff of 175 was reasonable to
capture the predictive information of the covariable.
Other continuous variables were first divided into quintiles
or tertiles. If hazard ratios for outlet strut fracture in 2 or more
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adjacent categories were not substantially different, these
categories were grouped together. A forward stepwise selec-
tion procedure was used to build the multivariate model. Only
those variables that had a P value ≤ .1 in univariate analyses
were entered into a stepwise model. The ease with which
documents could be abstracted differed significantly. For
example, in contrast with the different handwritings that had
to be deciphered on the unsystematically filled out valve
transport bags, the information on the fabrication orders was
typed in a systematic order. Moreover, a valve transport bag
had to be abstracted for each valve (n = 637), whereas fabri-
cation orders had to be abstracted for each lot from which the
valves came (n = 214). To establish which manufacturing
records are needed to predict the risk of outlet strut fracture,
a forward stepwise approach was chosen in which sets of
variables obtained from separate subdocuments were entered
sequentially.
The proportional hazards assumption was tested with time-
Table II. Items abstracted from manufacturing records apart from valve identifiers
Manufacturing 
Phase records Items abstracted
II Faborder Assembly of valve in Puerto Rico
First and last date
Size of lot to be assembled
Number of valves accepted at end of phase II
Identification numbers of polisher and quality control inspectors
III Baggy First and last date
CRRS Number of Baggies with valve
Version of the Baggy*
Number of disk serial numbers found on Baggy or CRRS
Tag with, mark on, or stamp on Baggy
Crack, disk pull, or weld noted or signed off on Baggy or CRRS
Indication of document falsification on Baggy or CRRS†
Hard spot, scratch or pit noted on Baggy
Number of times a standard activity, listed on Baggy, was signed off: disk fit, final polish, disk assembly,
disk assembly and touch-up, relieve weld, quality control, other
Total number of entries on Baggy
Number of hook and load deflection tests performed and results
Quality control signed off by employee E
Disk assembly and touch-up signed off by employee C
Identification number of employee signing off on final quality control 
IV DDC Number indicating that valve was returned to Shiley after recall
Date of administrative data check
Faborder, Fabrication order; Baggy, valve transport bag; CRRS, clean room rework sheet; DDC, device history data card.
*Seven different versions of the valve transport bags were identified. Versions were changed when manufacturing specifications changed.
†If some irregularity was detected at the weld site (eg, a crack), sometimes employee numbers would appear on the valve transport bag or clean room rework sheet
in fixed order, stating that the disk was pulled, the valve was rewelded, and the disk was assembled again. At times these employee numbers would be in the same
handwriting; if so, the employee number of an employee no longer employed would have been written next to the statement that the valve was rewelded (the so-called
“phantom welder”).21
Table I. Valve production scheme and process documentation
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Phase description Assembly of “semimanu- Outlet strut assembly Disk assembly and valve Attachment of suture ring; 
factured”articles touch up sterilization, packaging,
(not at Shiley) storage; administrative 
data check 
Documents* — Faborder Baggy DDC
Welding chart† CRRS‡
Unit of documentation Lot Valve Valve
Faborder, Fabrication order; Baggy, valve transport bag; CRRS, clean room rework sheet; DDC, device history data card.
*Manufacturing records were filled out to keep track of the valve during assembly. On these records, dates, activities, employee numbers and valve identifiers—ser-
ial numbers and lot numbers—were documented. Documents studied in this study are set in boldface.
†Previous studies.
‡Used only if the valve had to be touched up again after disk assembly and valve touch up.
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dependent covariates. Hazard ratios are presented with 95%
confidence intervals (CIs). By summing the coefficients
derived from the Cox model times the values of each variable
in the model, a prognostic index score for outlet strut fracture
was calculated for each patient. Higher values of prognostic
index mean higher hazard or shorter time to strut fracture;
lower values meant lower hazard or longer time to strut frac-
ture. Four models were built: model 1 contained only age,
without any manufacturing information; model 2 was like
model 1 but extended with data from the fabrication orders;
model 3 was further extended with information from the
valve transport bags, clean room rework sheet, and device
history data cards; and finally in model 4 information from
Shiley’s research database was added. Patients were catego-
rized into groups according to their prognostic indices
derived from models 1 and 4. For each model, 3 groups were
defined at arbitrary cutoff points (the 50th and 90th per-
centiles). Cumulative hazard curves, which were based on the
prognostic index group to which patients belonged, were esti-
mated for the 2 models, 1 and 4, with the Kaplan-Meier tech-
nique.12 Receiver operating characteristic curves were com-
puted to further describe the additional impact of the manu-
facturing characteristics on the risk of outlet strut fracture.
The relative area under the curve (AUC) was calculated
according to the nonparametric trapezoidal rule, with its SE
according to Hanley and McNeil.14 The SEs were used to
compute 95% CIs. The method of Hanley and McNeil15 was
used to test whether the differences between AUCs were sta-
tistically significant.
Results
Manufacturing records were matched with valve ser-
ial numbers for 637 of the 665 Dutch recipients of large
(‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave
mitral valves (95.8%). Twenty-eight valves could not
be matched because the valve serial number was (par-
tially) missing; no strut fractures were documented
among these valves.
Univariate analyses demonstrated an inverse relation-
Table III. Results of univariate analyses of selected predictors from the manufacturing records for outlet strut 
fracture in large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves
Characteristic present Characteristic absent
No. fractured/ No. fractured/
Manufacturing characteristic no. at risk Person-y no. at risk Person-y HR 95% CI
Documents about outlet strut assembly
Size of lot to be assembled 19/207 1813 6/430 4076 8.3 3.1-22
(‡ 175 valves)
Production time per valve in phase II
0.12-0.22 d* 9/217 2159 4/216 1994 2.2 0.7-7.2
<0.12 d* 12/204 1734 4/216 1994 3.8 1.2-12.0
Documents about disk assembly and valve touch-up
Baggy version 4 20/312 2706 5/325 3183 5.7 1.9-16.6
>1 disk used for this valve† 4/48 448 21/589 5440 2.4 0.8-6.9
>1 Baggy used with this valve 6/66 609 19/571 5280 2.8 1.1-7.0
Red mark on Baggy 8/112 1049 17/525 4839 2.3 1.0-5.3
>1 entry for standard task
Final polish 7/104 924 18/533 4965 2.1 0.9-5.1
Disk assembly 9/139 1289 16/498 4599 2.1 0.9-4.7
Relieve weld‡
Yes 2/60 500 22/410 3737 0.7 0.2-2.8
Missing 1/167 1652 22/410 3737 0.1 0.01-0.8
Other 1/143 1348 24/494 4541 0.2 0.02-1.1
Number of hook deflection tests performed§
1 12/204 1884 9/419 3921 3.0 1.2-7.3
‡ 2 4/14 84 9/419 3921 21 6.3-70
“Disk pull” noted on Baggy or CRRS 6/84 725 19/553 5164 2.3 0.9-5.9
“Crack” or “Weld” noted on Baggy or CRRS 6/55 427 19/582 5462 4.2 1.6-10.5
“Phantom welder” cited on Baggy or CRRS 4/28 209 21/609 5680 5.2 1.8-15.1
HR, Hazard ratio; Baggy, valve transport bag; CRRS, clean room rework sheet.
*Reference is production time per valve longer than 0.22 days.
†As indicated by the number of disk serial numbers found on the valve transport bag, the clean room rework sheet, and the device history data card; P = .11.
‡Missing; standard task “relieve weld” could not be signed off on 167 valve transport bags and was also not mentioned elsewhere on valve transport bag.
§The hook deflection test, a type of flexibility test, was performed from May 1980 until January 1982. The tests performed were retrieved from the valve transport
bag, the clean room rework sheet, and the device history data card. Reference was no hook deflection tests performed.
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ship between age and outlet strut fracture; the fracture
risk diminished by 5% per year of age (hazard ratio
0.95, 95% CI 0.93-0.98). Table III shows the univariate
associations with outlet strut fracture for manufactur-
ing characteristics for which the log-rank test had a P
value < .1. In multivariate analyses the risks of valves
that underwent 1 hook deflection test were similar to
those that underwent no hook deflection test. We there-
fore dichotomized this variable as follows: 1 or fewer
hook deflection tests performed (reference) versus 2 or
more hook deflection tests performed (crude hazard
ratio 12.6, 95% CI 4.3-37). Several employees tended
to be univariate predictors of outlet strut fracture (Table
IV). The risk of outlet strut fracture increased with each
additional percentage of valves reported fractured in a
lot in the Shiley research database (univariate hazard
ratio 1.4, 95% CI 1.3-1.5). In bivariate analyses none of
the other univariate predictors could account for the
relationship between the employee-specific variables
and strut fracture. Because all mechanical factors could
have been strongly employee dependent, we decided to
include only mechanical characteristics in the model.
Table V summarizes the results of 4 multivariate Cox
regression models; receiver operating characteristic
curves for each model are given in Fig 1. The first
model includes the only previously known risk factor,
age, and had an AUC of 0.71 (95% CI 0.59-0.83).
Addition of factors listed in Table III yielded models 2
(AUC 0.83, 95% CI 0.73-0.93) and 3 (AUC 0.87, 95%
CI 0.77-0.97). The 5-variable model (model 4), which
included age, all relevant variables from manufacturing
records, and the percentage of valves reported fractured
from a lot, had an AUC of 0.94 (95% CI 0.86-1.00). A
reduced 3-variable model that included only age, the
lot size, and the lot fracture percentage, had an AUC of
0.92 (95% CI 0.82-1.00). The AUCs of all models that
Table IV. Univariate associations between employees listed on manufacturing records and possibly coincidental
risk factors from the manufacturing records and risk of outlet strut fracture in large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-
Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves
Characteristic present Characteristic absent
No. fractured/ No. fractured/
Manufacturing characteristic no. at risk Person-y no. at risk Person-y HR 95% CI
Documents about outlet strut assembly
Employee who signed off for polishing valve 
after welding*
Polisher A 12/156 1359 2/129 1191 5.0 1.1-23
Polisher B 5/14 97 2/129 1191 29.2 5.7-150
Polisher identity unknown 6/338 3242 2/129 1191 0.9 0.2-4.8
Documents about disk assembly and valve touch-up
‡ 1 “Disk assembly and touch-up” entry on 11/149 1339 14/488 4549 2.7 1.2-6.1
“Baggy” by employee C
Last quality control inspection on 8/89 754 17/548 5135 3.4 1.5-7.9
“Baggy” by employee D
HR, Hazard ratio; Baggy, valve transport bag.
*Reference is known polishers other than A or B.
Table V. Results of multivariate analyses of selected predictors from the manufacturing records for strut fracture in
large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable HR 95% CI HR 95% CI HR 95%CI HR 95%CI
Age of valve 0.95 0.93-0.98 0.95 0.93-0.98 0.95 0.93-0.98 0.95 0.93-0.97
Size of lot assembled ‡ 175 valves 8.0 3.0-22 5.9 2.1-16.3 6.6 2.2-20.1
‡ 1 disk used for this valve 4.2 1.4-12.6 5.9 1.9-18.6
‡ 2 hook deflection tests 9.3 2.9-30.0 4.7 1.4-16.2
‡ 1 entry standard task “other” 0.2 0.02-1.3 — —
Percentage of valves from lot reported 1.6 1.4-1.8
fractured
HR, Hazard ratio.
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contained manufacturing information were significantly
larger than that of model 1 (all P values <.01), indicat-
ing that addition of manufacturing information im-
proves prediction of future outlet strut fracture.
Fig 2 provides information about the 3 prognostic index
groups of models 1 and 4. The cumulative hazard curves
of the 90th percentile groups of both models differed sig-
nificantly from each other (P log rank = .01), again
demonstrating the superior predictive ability of model 4.
Discussion
The main finding of this study is that information from
the manufacturing records can improve risk estimation
of outlet strut fracture in patients with large (‡ 29 mm)
60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves.
Valves from lots of at least 175 valves, valves that under-
went 2 or more hook deflection tests, and valves for
which more than 1 disk was used were at a markedly
increased risk of outlet strut fracture. In addition, the risk
of outlet strut fracture increased by 40% with each per-
centage of valves fractured from a lot. Adding lot size to
a model that contained only age added significantly to
the discrimination of which valves would fracture.
Although the number of other independent risk factors
obtained from the manufacturing records was sizable,
their added predictive value was marginal. A model that
contained the age, the lot size, and the lot fracture per-
centage but not the information from the valve transport
bags and the clean room rework sheets was only slightly
less predictive than that of the 5-term model.
Some of our methods deserve comment. Our first
model included only age, a factor known to be associ-
ated with the risk of strut fracture.4,16 Unlike others,8
we did not find that valves sized 31 or 33 mm were
Fig 1. Receiver operating characteristic curves of 4 prognostic models for outlet strut fracture in large-size (‡ 29
mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave mitral valves. Model 1, AUC 0.71 (95% CI 0.59-0.83); model 2,
AUC 0.83 (95% CI 0.73-0.93, P < .01 versus model 1); model 3, AUC 0.87 (95% CI 0.77-0.97, P < .01 versus
model 1); model 4, AUC 0.94 (95% CI 0.86-1.00, P < .01 versus model 1).
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more likely to fracture than were valves sized 29 mm.
Technically all valves sized 29 mm and larger were the
same because for the construction of 31 or 33 mm outer
diameters, different sizes of sewing rings were put
around a 29-mm flange. We therefore did not include
valve size in our initial model. A relationship between
the weld date and the risk of outlet strut fracture has
previously been reported.1,5,8 Because weld date is
probably a proxy for specific manufacturing character-
istics, we did not include it in our model. When added
to our final model, weld date (before 1981 versus 1981-
1984)5,8 was no longer a risk factor for outlet strut frac-
ture. This was also true when weld date was added to
the model that included only age, lot size, and the lot
fracture percentage.
The excellent performance of the final model in this
study, as characterized by the area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve, may be partly attribut-
able to the fact that the same population was used to
estimate the risk factors of outlet strut fracture and the
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve.
The performance of these models in other populations,
for example in the ongoing British cohort study, may
be somewhat less.
It has been proposed that batch-related differences are
associated with the risk of outlet strut fracture.1 The
Fig 2. Cumulative hazards of strut fracture of models 1 (A) and 4 (B). 1, 50th percentile or less; 2, 50th through
80th percentiles; 3, 90th percentile and higher.
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findings in our study support this view. The 637 large
(‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley convexo-concave
valves came from 214 lots. Fractures were reported in
35 of these lots. We found a strong relationship between
the lot fracture percentage and outlet strut fracture.
Furthermore, valves that came from lots of 175 valves
or more were at a higher risk for outlet strut fracture.
Because Björk-Shiley convexo-concave valves frac-
ture at the weld, deficiencies found at the weld or pro-
cedures affecting the weld might be risk factors for out-
let strut fracture.5,6,17 Although others found welder
identity to be associated with outlet strut fracture,8 we
were not able to confirm this in a previous study.5
Metallurgic analyses of fractured Björk-Shiley con-
vexo-concave valves have shown that 1 leg of the out-
let strut fractures before the other.6,17 A metallurgic
study of 24 valves that were prophylactically explanted
after the alarming findings in the first Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave cohort study revealed single-leg frac-
tures in 7 valves and a crack in 1.17 We therefore
hypothesized that valves with valve transport bags or
clean room rework sheets indicating cracks would be at
higher risk for outlet strut fracture. Indeed, valves with
valve transport bags and clean room rework sheets indi-
cating “disk pull,” “cracks,” “rewelds,” or “phantom
welder” falsification (Table II) were associated with a
markedly increased risk of outlet strut fracture in uni-
variate analyses. However, these variables were no
longer significant when entered in a multivariate
model. The same was true for the standard activities
“final polish” and “disk assembly.” The reason is that
these variables are highly correlated with one another
and with the number of flexibility tests (hook deflec-
tion tests) performed. The only variable retained in our
final model was the number of hook deflection tests
performed, a variable that may be a proxy of cracked or
rewelded valves. Alternatively, this may imply that a
flexibility test performed on a deficient valve is the last
straw, providing the stress that leads to fracture.
The finding that valves for which more than 1 disk was
used were at higher risk for outlet strut fracture is also
consistent with the hypothesis that procedures that affect
the weld are risk factors for outlet strut fracture. Each
time a disk was put into the valve, the outlet strut had to
be bent somewhat, thus applying stress to the weld.
Only 2 other studies have been performed on the rela-
tionship between manufacturing characteristics and
outlet strut fracture, both by the same group.8,18 Like
us, Walker and associates18 found lot fracture percent-
age to be an important independent predictor of strut
fracture. This consistent finding underscores the impor-
tance of this variable. Moreover, both we5 and Walker
and associates8 found valves welded before 1981 to be
at a lower risk for strut fracture than valves welded
from 1981 to 1984. However, although Walker and
associates8 stated that no specific manufacturing proce-
dure or personnel appeared to be uniquely associated
with this period, we found a relationship of lot size,
production time per valve, and percentage of accep-
tance after outlet strut assembly with calendar time.
The lot size was larger, the production time per valve
was shorter, and the percentage of valves accepted was
higher during 1981 and 1982. All these factors may
reflect production pressure during this period. We also
found a relationship between certain employees listed
in Table IV, welder identity, and the calendar period.
The number of disks used for a valve also differed
between valves manufactured before 1981 and from
1981 to 1984; before 1981 more often more than 1 disk
was used for a valve. Finally, the falsification of valve
transport bags and clean room rework sheets was virtu-
ally confined to the 1981 and 1982 period. In contrast
to our findings, Walker and colleagues8,18 reported out-
let strut flexibility—based on the results of the several
flexibility tests—and welder identity to be associated
with outlet strut fracture.
There are several explanations for the somewhat dif-
fering results of our and Walker’s studies. First, from
the methods section of the Walker articles, it appears
that some of the risk factors found in this study were
not included in their analyses.8,18 Next, our study is
restricted to large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave mitral valves. Compared with other
recipients of 60-degree valves, this subgroup of recipi-
ents of 60-degree valves is at the highest risk,1,4,16 and
risk estimation is therefore especially important for this
subgroup. Because no such restriction was made by
Walker and coworkers,8 the added value of production-
related risk factors may be diluted in a model that
includes valve size and position, factors known to be
strongly associated with outlet strut fracture.1,4,16,19
Furthermore, in matching case patients and control
subjects by implanting surgeon it may well be that
Walker and colleagues8,18 indirectly matched according
to the lots from which valves derived; that is, several
valves from a single lot could have been distributed to
the same hospital. Finally, if valves from different
batches were distributed in the United States and The
Netherlands, batch-related differences could account
for differences between the 2 studies.
The decision whether to reoperate or to reassure
recipients of large (‡ 29 mm) 60-degree Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave mitral valves has to be made in the
face of many uncertainties. Because of the risks associ-
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ated with prophylactic replacement of Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave valves,17,20 improved prediction of
outlet strut fracture not only benefits patients who are
at high risk for strut fracture but, by preventing unnec-
essary operations, also benefits patients at low risk for
strut fracture. Our findings suggest that the lot size
(<175 valves versus ‡ 175 valves) and the lot fracture
percentage add significantly to prediction of outlet strut
fracture. The development of a new decision analytic
model that incorporates these new risk factors is a log-
ical next step. Information on the lot fracture percent-
age and lot size is already partially available (lot frac-
ture percentage) or easily obtainable (lot size). To
facilitate decision making, Shiley should publish the lot
size and lot fracture percentage for each valve serial
number, just as the estimated fracture rates were pub-
lished in the past. Information about the number of
flexibility tests performed and the number of disks
used for a valve could be used in the cases of patients
for whom no unequivocal advice can be provided with
the more limited model. Importantly, however, manu-
facturing information is valuable only if the serial num-
ber of a valve is known.
Finally, one would want to know whether the results
of this study can be generalized to other 60-degree
valves. Although we restricted our analyses to large 60-
degree mitral valves, large 60-degree aortic valves are
technically the same, and our results are likely to apply
similarly to this group of valves. With respect to the
small (<29 mm) 60-degree valves, only 3 fractures
were reported among the 1421 valves implanted in The
Netherlands, so no analyses could be done. However,
the fact that the 3 fractured valves came from relative-
ly large lots, in which 3.6%, 1.7% and 1.3% of the
valves believed to be implanted had been fractured,
respectively, suggests that risk factors found in this
study will also apply to small valves.
We thank Dr E. Steyerberg for his valuable help.
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Appendix
Participating centers were as follows: Academisch
Medisch Centrum (B. A. J. M. de Mol), Onze Lieve Vrouwe
Gasthuis Amsterdam (L. Eijsman), Medisch Centrum de
Klokkenberg (T. R. van Geldorp), Academisch Ziekenhuis
Leiden (H. Huysmans), Sint Antonius Ziekenhuis
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Nieuwegein (J. J. A. M. T. Defauw), Academisch Ziekenhuis
Utrecht (J. J. Bredee), Academisch Ziekenhuis Groningen (T.
Ebels), Dijkzigt Ziekenhuis Rotterdam (L. A. van
Herwerden), and Sint Radboud Ziekenhuis (L. K. Lacquet).
Commentary
This study of risk factors for outlet strut fracture with
the Björk-Shiley convexo-concave heart valve (Shiley,
Inc, Irvine, Calif) by Kallewaard and associates
involved the expenditure of an enormous amount of
time and effort. Using statistical methods applied to
painstakingly collected data, the Dutch investigators
have identified some risk factors related to the Björk-
Shiley convexo-concave manufacturing process and
have used certain combinations to create multivariable
risk models. The earliest risk factors identified for strut
fracture of Björk-Shiley convexo-concave 60-degree
valves1 were valve size of 29 mm or more and manu-
facturing period of February 1981 to June 1982. The
present paper discovered some variables that might be
indirect contributors to the manufacturing-period effect.
Incremental value. Multivariable risk models using
these manufacturing variables plus patient age were
able to separate the patients receiving the Björk-Shiley
convexo-concave valve into distinct risk groups, as
shown by cumulative hazard functions (see the authors’
Fig 2). To assess their predictive value, the models that
included these manufacturing characteristics were
compared using (non–time-related) receiver operating
characteristic analysis to a model that contained only
age (see the authors’ Fig 1). 
The currently available multivariable risk model for
strut fracture in the Björk-Shiley 60-degree convexo-
concave valve was developed by the court-appointed
Bowling-Pfizer Supervisory Panel and its consultants.2
The Bowling-Pfizer model used more than 400 known
fractures (compared with 25 in the present investiga-
tion). In addition to position and age, the Bowling-
Pfizer risk factors are valve size (29 vs 31 vs 33 mm),
weld date, welder group, and shop order group. These
variables could be strong surrogates for the variables
identified in the present paper. A better assessment of
the models derived in this paper would be to compare
their predictive power to that of the Bowling-Pfizer
model. 
Implementation. The authors suggest that Shiley
should publish lot size and lot fracture percentage by
valve serial number to facilitate decision making.
However, such a policy would burden the individual
clinician with a dilemma of interpretation. A more ratio-
nal approach would be to incorporate these new manu-
facturing variables into the current multivariable model.
If they are determined to add significant improvement,
then the probabilities derived from the enhanced model
could be used in future patient management decisions.
Current risk. In the highest risk subgroup identified
by these models (top line in panel B of Fig 2), the
instantaneous hazard (which equals the slope of the
cumulative hazard) fell dramatically after about 9
years. There has been only one additional fracture in
that highest risk group in 17 years, and the slope in that
curve after 9 years does not appear different from that
of the other risk groups. The Björk-Shiley 60-degree
convexo-concave valves were manufactured from 1979
to 1986, so in patients who are still alive this valve has
been in place for between 13 and 20 years, when the
additional risk associated with these manufacturing
variables seems to have subsided. 
Actual risk. The cumulative hazard curves (Fig 2)
represent a potential risk only; to experience it, the
patient must continue to live. The competing risk of
death from other causes is great in these patients who
are now at least 13 years beyond their operation. If this
were accounted for, the risk of actually experiencing
fracture during a patient’s remaining lifetime—the
cumulative incidence function3—would be less than
half of what the cumulative hazard curves imply.
Conclusion. The risk of strut fracture for the groups
identified by these manufacturing variables has de-
creased over time, while the risk of dying of other caus-
es is increasing. The risk of explant surgery continues to
increase as the patients age. The manufacturing variables
identified by this study as significant risk factors may
already be represented by surrogates (weld date, welder,
shop order group) in the Bowling-Pfizer model. Thus,
although this work may shed some light on the mecha-
nism of strut fracture, whether this information can be
used to improve patient management is doubtful.
Gary L. Grunkemeier, PhD
Portland, Ore
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